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FRAGMENTS OF REGIONALISM: STATE
AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN
CONNECTICUT AT CENTURY'S END
TERRY J. TONDRO*
Other articles in this symposium on Regional Land Use
Planning address specific aspects of regional planning and
cooperation, such as sprawl, protecting natural resources, and
providing regional equity in schools and housing. I am going to
examine how towns in my state, Connecticut, have reacted to the
increasing pressures to consider the impact of local decisions on
other municipalities in its metropolitan region. While
Connecticut's institutions and laws reflect some of these
pressures for regional planning and cooperation, the overall
picture is one of ad hoc responses to particular situations, rather
than the result of a planned evolution. Regional planning may
be inevitable, and some consider it necessary, but Connecticut's
experience is that it will be haphazard and not at all
coordinated. Unfortunately, it appears that the whole of
regional planning and cooperation-its theory-may well be less
than the sum of its parts-its implementation-unless stronger
and more broadly based leadership asserts itself.
The central idea underlying regional land use planning is
that barriers formed by town boundaries, previously thought
impenetrable, need to be broken down to enable effective
government action over a broader area when circumstances
require it. Generally, those circumstances occur when
significant externalities are imposed by actions of one town on a
neighboring town or towns. 1 A more centralized authority is
required to ensure that a town considers the effect of its
decisions on areas beyond its municipal borders. Several
* Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr., Professor of Real Property Law, University of
Connecticut School of Law.
1 See Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong With
Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 284 (1996) (stating that market failure is the
basis for the argument on land-use planning).
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objectives, not all consistent, can be pursued with a regional
planning agenda. For some, regionalism holds out the promise
of income redistribution to achieve greater economic equality
among neighboring towns. Minnesota's pioneering "Fiscal
Disparities Act" is perhaps the leading example and one which
some urge Connecticut to adopt.2 For others, regionalism's
primary benefit will increase economic, racial, and ethnic
integration.3 Reviving central cities is another reason to support
regional planning efforts.4 Others see regionalism as a means of
stopping sprawl and preserving open space.5 Municipal officials
often see regional cooperation as a means of increasing the
quality of services they are able to provide citizens, while
decreasing costs. 6
Regardless of the objective, Connecticut's experience
suggests that the successes in using regionally based efforts
2 Connecticut State Assembly Representative Jefferson Davis is one of the
leaders in a continuing but unsuccessful effort to have Connecticut adopt a tax base
sharing plan, based on the Minnesota model, to remedy the fiscal disparities
between towns. See his remarks as co-chair of the legislature's Planning and
Development Committee concerning unsuccessful legislation introduced this past
session entitled, An Act Concerning Municipal Fiscal Disparities, H.B. 6688 Jan.
Sess. (1999), H.R. Proc. 32-000498 (Mar. 1, 1999). For a discussion of Minnesota's
pioneering model, see Note, Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act-An
Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1975).
3 See James A. Kushner, Growth Management and the City, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 68, 92 (1994) ("Urban growth management.., must promote... economic and
racial integration, and social equity for all residents of the city.").
4 See Robert D. Bullard, Building Just, Safe, and Healthy Communities, 12
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 392 (1999) (discussing industry flight from central cities as
furthering "social and economic inequalities").
5 See Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure Law
in Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1240 (1997) (stating that "continuing suburban
sprawl.., helped create a severe shortage of housing within the financial reach of
low- and moderate-income families in Connecticut").
6 Firefighter unions in four New Jersey towns have been unsuccessful in their
efforts to prevent the consolidation of their fire departments. See Judge Dismisses
Suit by Firefighters to Block Regional Department, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at
B23. The proponents of combining fire departments claimed the result would reduce
the cost while enhancing efficiency. Mayor Rudy Garcia of Union City stated that
"[regionalization is going to be good for the taxpayer... [and] for residents' safety."
Id. In Connecticut, union pressure has successfully prevented two towns from
consolidating firehouses that were less than ten blocks from each other, one in each
town. As in New Jersey, the firefighters would have been authorized to respond to
fires and other emergencies in both towns, depending upon need rather than the
adventitious location of municipal boundaries.
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occurred over intense opposition and without any regional
planning activity or the participation of land use planners.
I. THE BACKGROUND STRUCTURES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
IN CONNECTICUT
Public land use planning requires some unit of government
to be in control of a structure to develop and, hopefully, enforce
the plan. In Connecticut, there are some regional or statewide
institutions that do some land use planning for areas larger than
individual towns. These institutions, however, have very limited
power.
Connecticut used to have an institutional arrangement that
carried out planning at a larger scale. In 1959, however, the
state legislature abolished county government in Connecticut.7
The reasons were complex, but they included the desire to get rid
of what some perceived as a corrupt and unnecessary level of
government.8 The only remnant of county government is the
office of the sheriff, "whose election is mandated in the state
constitution," and who essentially oversees legal service.9
Connecticut Governor John G. Rowland has even proposed that
that last vestige of county government be abolished.10
The counties, had they still existed, would have been a
viable starting point for regional government. Instead,
Connecticut has 169 independent towns and cities, most with no
institutionalized ties to one another." Many of these,
particularly the central (and distressed) cities that normally
form the core of regional growth patterns, are geographically
7 See Tom Condon, Counties Are Worth a New Look, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan.
10, 1999, at Bi, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
8 See id. (quoting Robert Satter, a state legislator in 1959, who referred to
county government systems as "archaic").
9 Id.
10 See Christopher Keating & Stephen Ohlemacher, Bid to Eliminate Sheriffs
Defeated, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 27, 1999, at A3 (discussing the defeat of
Governor Rowland's plan for a constitutional amendment to abolish the office of the
sheriff), available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
11 See Don Noel, A Headless Regional Government is Better Than None at All,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 28, 1995, at All, available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library.
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quite small. Hartford, for example, is one of the smallest central
cities in the United States.12
The regional approaches to solving land use problems that
exist in Connecticut are voluntary. When the counties were
abolished by the Constitutional Convention, Article X of the
Constitution authorized the General Assembly to prescribe the
methods under which towns could establish regional
governments and inter-town compacts.' 3 The Connecticut Office
of Policy and Management, whose functions include monitoring
intergovernmental relationships, has examined and catalogued
over 900 existing inter-municipal cooperative agreements. 14 One
of the most frequent purposes for creating a compact is to
establish regional school districts. A large number of compacts
deal with less policy-oriented subjects, such as providing for joint
building code enforcement or regional health districts.
Significant entities have been created by compact as well. The
Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) is a powerful entity in
the Hartford region whose mission is to provide water and sewer
services to member towns and to protect the water supplies that
are used by those towns. 15 Until very recently, the MDC has
limited its role to simply arranging for water and sewage
services, eschewing any larger role in encouraging inter-town
cooperation on land use problems. 16
Of the more than 900 compacts, only two concern one
particularly sensitive political issue: The provision of low cost
housing in a central city and its participating suburbs. Hartford
and Bridgeport formed these two compacts in the late 1980s. 17
1 Compare Density Using Land Area for States, Counties, Metropolitan Areas,
and Places (Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/
90denma.txt>, with Land Area, Population, and Density for Places in Connecticut:
1990 (visited Jan. 6, 2000) <http'//www.census.gov/population/census.gov/
population/censusdata/places/09ct.txt>.
13 See CONN. CONST. art. X, § 2; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-330 to -339i
(1999).
14 Telephone Interview with David Russell, Office of Policy and Management,
State of Connecticut (Feb. 15, 1999).
15 See Noel, supra note 11, at All.
16 See Lisa Chedekel, Hartford Council to Discuss Management of Riverfront,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 9, 1996, at B3, available in LEXIS, News & Information
Library.
17 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Urban Housing: A Strategic Role for the States, 12
YALE L. & POLY REV. 93, 111-12 n.94 (1994) (citing Lawrence E. Susskind & Susan
L. Podziba, AFFORDABLE HOUSING MEDIATION: BUILDING CONSENSUS FOR
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The Bridgeport compact was not quite as successful as
Hartford's; while five towns originally sat down with Bridgeport
to work out the compact, two of the towns rejected the compact
endorsed by their representatives. 18 Hartford had more success,
as twenty-five of the twenty-nine original participants signed the
compact, which has been one of the more successful efforts to
facilitate the production of more affordable housing in
Connecticut. 19
The Hartford Fair Housing Compact was put together by the
Capitol Region Council of Governments (CRCOG).20 After the
original five-year term of the compact, a Regional Housing Policy
Statement replaced the agreement.21 The CRCOG Housing
Committee felt that the provision of affordable housing needed to
be integrated into a comprehensive community development
policy, rather than existing as an independent effort.22 The
principal focus of the Regional Housing Policy Statement
remains encouraging the development of affordable housing
throughout the region.2 This effort is one of the few examples of
a meaningful attempt to encourage metropolitan area residents
to expand their perspectives beyond the limitations of town
boundaries.
Not all the areas of Connecticut have a regional Council of
Governments (COG) such as CRCOG, or a Council of Elected
Officials (CEO), but all towns in Connecticut belong to a
Regional Planning Agency. A network of fourteen Regional
Planning Agencies (RPAs) was established by statute in the late
1950s, and covers every part of the state.24 Where there is a
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE HARTFORD AND GREATER BRIDGEPORT AREAS 1
(1990)).
is See id.
19 See Michael Wheeler, Regional Consensus on Affordable Housing: Yes In My
Backyard?, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 139 (1993).
20 See Mike Swift, Housing Plan Challenges Value of Regionalism Compact
Among Towns May Prove Inadequate Solution, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 13, 1995,
at A10, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
21 See Paul Marks, Town Asked to Ratify Regional Housing Policy, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 6, 1997, at B3, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
22 See id.
2 See memorandum from Beatrice Stockwell, Chair, Farmington Town Council
and CRCOG Housing Committee (Mar. 6, 1997) (on file with author) (requesting
approval by the CRCOG's member towns of the Draft Regional Housing Policy).
24 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-31a to -37b (1999) (detailing formation and
administration of Regional Planning Agencies).
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COG or a CEO serving the same area, it is usually affiliated with
the appropriate RPA. Elected officials in member towns meet in
the COG or the CEO, whereas town land use commission
members meet as the RPA. During the 1970s the power of the
RPAs was extensive, spurred by a federal Office of Management
and Budget regulation requiring municipalities to submit their
federal grant applications to a local RPA for comment, before
sending the application to Washington. 25 This approval process
provided the RPAs, and constituent towns, with a mechanism
that allowed them to wield significant leverage to bring about
changes in a municipality's application. This consulting
requirement, however, was eliminated from federal programs in
1982, thereby changing the primary role of many of the RPAs.
Today, the RPAs provide technical assistance to member towns,
assist the towns in entering into cooperative agreements with
one another, and help maintain federal and state grants for
beneficial programs.26 These are useful services, of course, but
they are not particularly effective regional planning methods.27
One of the other tasks of the RPAs is to submit to the state's
Office of Policy and Management (OPM) a proposed plan of
conservation and development for its region.28 OPM then
theoretically uses these plans to create a state plan of
conservation and development.29 The Connecticut legislature
authorized the state to prepare a state plan in 1971, and in 1976
it required that the legislature approve the plan.30 The plan was
put on a five-year cycle in 1983. The plan, however, only
provides guidance to state agencies when spending state or
federal funds. It does not control regulatory activity-not even
activities by state agencies.31 The plan's primary force stems
2 See Federal and Federally Assisted Programs and Projects: Evaluation,
Review, and Coordination (Circular A-95), 38 Fed. Reg. 32,874 (1973). The
reviewing system is described (and somewhat overly praised) in Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr.,
Local Control Over Federally Funded Projects, 19 N.Y.L.F. 113 (1973). Note that 39
Fed. Reg. 32,874 was revoked by President Reagan's Intergovernmental Review of
Federal Programs. Exec. Order No. 12,372,47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (1982).
26 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §8-164 (1999).
27 Telephone Interview with Richard Eigen, Regional Planner, Valley Regional
Planning Agency (Sept. 17, 1999).
28 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §16a-26 (1999).
2 See id.
30 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 16a-24 to -33 (1999).
31 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a-31 (1999).
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from the requirement that OPM review activities of all state
agencies and provide a report "commenting on the extent to
which the proposed plan conforms to the state plan."3 2 Repeated
efforts to apply the plan to private development decisions
through municipalities' land use controls have been rebuffed.33
Thus, a town can ignore the plan when the town's zoning
regulations include provisions contrary to it. There is a clear
disjunction between effective local control and ineffective
statewide control over land uses.
In response to many inquiries as to the structure of the state
plan, an official at OPM has insisted that it is a separate policy
statement developed at state level rather than a compilation of
regional plans. Assuming, arguendo, Connecticut did prepare its
own original state plan, the categories it uses are so broad that it
cannot effectively distinguish between land uses. The regional
plans are better able to guide local land usage simply because
the RPAs are closer to the towns within their planning areas.
But the RPAs have no internal monetary resources with which to
implement their plans, so they have to modify their plans to
match the available funding from state and federal sources.
Thus, Connecticut's state plan of conservation and development
is the result of a planning process, which is a reaction to the
availability of money, rather than a creation of a municipal or
regional vision. The Connecticut Agencies Regulations require
each state agency to consider the plan before participating in any
program, which affects land use.34 It seems irrational to believe
a state agency would not spend appropriated money on a
program simply because the state plan makes no provision for
that program in a location where the town (and therefore
probably the RPA) wants it. Since the state plan is continuously
32 Id.; see also State of Connecticut, Policies Plan for the Conservation and
Development of Connecticut, 1998-2003, at 1-2 <http:/ /www.opm.state.ct.us/pdpd3
physical/ C&DPlan C&Dintro.htm>.
33 See, e.g., 32 H.R. Proc. 542-30, 1989 Sess. 10605 (Conn. 1989). In the House
debate on the adoption of the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure, discussed
infra Part 2.b., it was asked whether a town could deny a zoning application
because it conflicted with the state plan of Conservation and Development.
Representative Cibes, a proponent of the proposed legislation, opined that it would
be an improper reason for denying the application, citing his frustration with his
inability over the years to get the legislature to broaden the impact of the state plan
so that it would apply to municipalities. See id. at 10605-07.
34 See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 8-198-6 (1999).
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amended during its five-year lifespan, the RPA can simply
propose an amendment that allows the state agency to provide
the desired service in the appropriate location.
Thus far mere fragments of regional and state planning
have been described. It is a bit optimistic to suggest that any of
these efforts might provide a basis for cooperation between
towns on land use. This is illustrated by the recent effort to
maintain newly created beaches and parks along the Connecticut
River. A private non-profit organization, Riverfront Recapture,
had worked successfully to open up the Connecticut River
around Hartford for recreation and needed a funding source for
the subsequently necessary maintenance and supervision. The
state declined to take over the beaches, boat launches, and
similar new facilities because of the amount of annual funding
required. Riverfront Recapture proposed the MDC, an
established a water and sewer provider in and around Hartford,
provide the required management services, and pay the costs by
increasing its water charges by $0.50 per water user per
month.35
Two of MDC's eight member towns at first voted against the
proposal.3 6 Those who chose to speak at public hearings on the
proposed funding were concerned with the possibility of what
they perceived as higher taxes.37 Conversely, the local political
leaders who opposed the plan cited the loss of each town's control
over its own park system.38
35 See Editorial, Riverfront Plan Gains an Anchor; Our Towns; Greater
Hartford, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 6, 1997, at A8, available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library.
36 See Mike Swift, MDC Commits to River Park System, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 2, 1997, at A3, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
37 See, e.g., Daniela Altimari & Mike Swift, River Parks Plan Has a Slippery
Stumbling Block: Who's Going to Pay?, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 7, 1997, at A6,
available in LEXIS, News & Information Library; Angie Chuang, Wethersfield
Opposes MDC Fee for Riverfront Park, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 16, 1997, at B5,
available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
38 See Chuang, supra note 37 (expressing fear of a regional government in
Wethersfield); Christine Dempsey, Questions Persist About Riverfront Plan,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 16, 1997, at B3 (discussing East Hartford's concern that
the proposal violated the town charter's prohibition on transferring any power to
another government body without a referendum, and that it might lead to the
creation of a "regional government"), available in LEXIS, News & Information
Library. Some of the objections also focused on a recent problem the MDC had with
the flooding and pollution of a picturesque cove in one of the towns. See Chuang,
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Eventually the MDC Board voted to approve the proposal
over the objections of two holdout towns.3 9 One of the holdouts
was Wethersfield, the town just downstream from Hartford,
which apparently could not anticipate any benefit from
improvements made immediately upstream of its boundary.
The outcome of the MDC battle is a bright note in the effort
to bring about cooperation among towns to achieve important
objectives. It also was a tribute to the citizens who worked with
Riverfront Recapture to create a truly regional asset. But the
holdout towns are surprisingly unwilling to assume
responsibility for a regional project. This unwillingness came
from a fear that they would lose control over town parks, which
are already open to residents and nonresidents. This illustrates
how powerful the image and rhetoric of home rule can be.
I. LEGISLATIVE TIMIDITY AND JUDICIAL COMPLAISANCE
A. Judicial Review of Decisions with Regional Impact
In 1985, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") denied
statutorily required permits to Mall Properties, Inc., thereby,
thwarting the company's plans to build a regional mall in North
Haven.40 This denial was the desired result of the advocates of
regional cooperation who feared the mall would harm the
economy of New Haven, a city ten miles south of North Haven.41
Even the governor of Connecticut opposed the idea, indicating
that "he felt it was not worth the risk to New Haven of building
the North Haven Mall.' "42 An administrative law judge denied
the permits because of their anticipated negative socio-economic
supra note 37; Angie Chuang, Hard Questions Expected for MDC, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 6, 1997, at Bi; Lizabeth Hall, Opposition to Park-Upkeep Plan
Swells, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 13, 1997, at B9, available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library.
39 See Swift, supra note 36, at A3.
40 See Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 563-64 (D. Mass. 1987)
(discussing the Corps's order which denied the permits required by section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403,
1344(1994)).
41 See Mall Properties, Inc., 672 F. Supp. at 564-65.
42 Id. at 574 (quoting the Record of Decision at 47).
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impacts on New Haven.43 The judge considered himself bound
by the Corps' regulations to consider both land use and non-land
use factors. 4 The latter included "conservation, economics,
aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, cultural
values, flood hazards, flood plain values, navigation, [etc.]." 45
Mall Properties appealed the Corps' decision to the Federal
District Court, which reversed and remanded the case to the
Corps.46 The District Court ordered the Corps to decide the
appeal without considering the socio-economic factors.47 The
District Court found that the Corps should only consider those
effects "which are proximately related to changes in the physical
environment."48 Consequently, any economic effects, which
might occur regardless of the mall's location in North Haven,
could not be properly considered. 49
The court based its decision on the legislative history of the
Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and the Rivers
and Harbors Act.50 The purpose of section 404 of the Clean
Water Act was "to 'protect the quality of water and to protect
critical wetlands.' "51 Hence, the District Court held that the
Corps is authorized to examine only the realm of economic
impacts resulting from the changes in the physical
environment. 52 The court found section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act similarly limited to "effects proximately caused by
changes in the physical environment."53
43 See id. at 564 (quoting the Record of Decision from Colonel Sciple) ("Still
weighing most heavily, however, is my concern for the socio-economic impacts this
project would have on the city of New Haven.").
4See id.
45 Id.
4 See id. at 575.
47 See id.
48 Id. at 566.
49 Id.
6o See id. at 567-71 (discussing the legislative history and case law in detail
and concluding that they "indicate that the Corps may not rely upon economic
factors which are not proximately related to changes in the physical environment in
denying a dredge or fill permit").
51 Id. at 567 (quoting H.R. 95-14 (1977), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
DIVISION, 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977: A
CONTINUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT, at 532 (1978)).
52 See id.
53 Id. at 569.
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The legislative history of section 10 quoted by the court to
support its limited concept of the Corps' scope of review,
however, does not persuasively support the court's
interpretation. The court acknowledged that the interests to be
protected under section 10 have evolved since its adoption in the
nineteenth century, quoting from a 1970 House Report. The
Report discussed a proposed and subsequently adopted
regulation that expanded the Corps's scope of review to "'consid-
eration of the effects which the proposed work will have, not only
on navigation, but also on conservation of natural resources, fish
and wildlife, air and water quality, aesthetics, scenic view,
historic sites, ecology and other public interest aspects of the
waterway [being filled or dredged, etc.].'- 54
The court then jumped to the conclusion that the only proper
economic aspects to be considered are those that have an impact
"on" the waterway.55 This is a considerably smaller scope of
inquiry than one based on the " 'public interest aspects of the
waterway,' " the language of the Congressional report.56 Mall
Properties cites two cases to support its limited vision of the
Corps' proper economic concerns. 57 Buttrey v. United States58
upheld (without explanation) the Corps' view that job creation
was not the sort of economic impact the expanded statute
intended to be considered. 59 In Hough v. Marsh,60 the court held
that while the Corps had properly considered jobs and municipal
tax impacts, it had failed to "address properly" the mandated
economics factors because it "sidestepped any consideration of
adverse economic effects particularly... the 'elimination of an
attraction... on the itinerary of sightseeing buses.' "61 Hough's
view of the Corps' scope of inquiry is indicated in the next
sentence, not quoted in Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, "[t]his
conclusion [of the Corps] ... ignores the directive in the Corps
4 Id. at 568 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-917, at 6 (1970)) (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 575 (concluding that the Corps was incorrect to review effects "not
proximately related to impacts on the physical environment").
56 Id. at 568 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-917, at 6 (1970)).
57 See id. at 569.
68 690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982).
59 See id. at 1180.
60 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982).
61 Id. at 86.
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regulations to consider all economic factors." 62 Nevertheless,
Mall Properties considers Hough as well as Buttrey to support
Mall Properties' narrow view of the proper scope of economic
inquiry, even though Hough as well as the statutory history,
suggest the scope of inquiry should be broadened rather than
narrowed.
Mall Properties quoted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,63
which identified the issue in public interest cases as defining "a
manageable line between those causal changes that may make
an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not."64 The
U.S. Supreme Court said courts must "consider the closeness of
the relationship between the change in the environment and the
'effect' at issue."65 They must recognize that not even all the "
'effects that are 'caused by' a change in the physical environment
in the sense of 'but for' causation [need be considered] ...
because the causal chain [may be] too attenuated; "and that the
Corps can only consider factors having a "reasonably close causal
relationship between a change in the physical environment and
the effect at issue."66
From this sketchy guidance, Mall Properties decided to draw
the line between proper and improper economic concerns so that
the Corps could not consider those economic effects which would
have resulted from the mere existence of "a mall anywhere in
North Haven."67  The real question, according to the
Congressional Report and Hough, is the nature of the impact
that will result from the project's filling of the waterway that
give the Corps its jurisdiction.68 A regional mall built on landfill
in a wetlands will have an economic impact on the property
across the street from it, within the town (due to tax revenues,
use of town streets, etc.), and on property outside of the town, if
its location is on the town border.69 Those impacts can extend
62 Id. (emphasis added).
460 U.S. 766 (1983).
64 Id. at 774 n.7.
65 Id. at 772.
6 Id. at 774.
67 Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 F. Supp. 561, 569 (D. Mass. 1987)
(emphasis added).




further depending on a multitude of considerations that the
Corps is authorized to consider. If a court is going to reverse the
Corps' decision, an explanation ought to be given. Yet Mall
Properties offers no explanation for why it has chosen to draw
the "manageable line" where it did.
What is left then is the apparent conclusion by Mall
Properties that New Haven was too far away to be impacted by
the proposed new regional shopping mall in North Haven.
Nothing in the decision supports that interpretation, nor does it
provide any reasoned basis for considering the economic
relationship of North Haven and New Haven to be "too
attenuated," or not "close enough." There is no indication of the
desired proximity. If the Corps' decision had been upheld, New
Haven's ability to compel North Haven and Mall Properties to
compensate the city for losses it sustained from the North Haven
project would have been substantially enhanced. The result
would probably have been a decision by the developer made
sensitive to the fact that North Haven is not an island unto
itself, but instead exists in a neighborhood of municipalities all
related to each other. The court's failure to articulate the
appropriate considerations for deciding when a development has
metropolitan-wide significance reflects the reluctance of our
political institutions to recognize or address the economic and
social interrelationships between Connecticut towns.
B. Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure
Perhaps the best-known effort to get Connecticut towns to
think regionally is the Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals
Act.70 The Commission's charge was to find ways to reduce the
barriers to the development of affordable housing, as well as to
find ways to encourage its construction. The author served as
the co-chair of the Land Use Subcommittee of the Governor's
Blue Ribbon Commission on Housing from 1988 to 1990, and the
section 8-30g procedure was the subcommittee's central
recommendation. Several incentives to encourage the creation of
affordable housing were authorized7 1-although funding was
never provided for them at the requisite levels-and one big
70 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999).
71 See e.g., the Connecticut Housing Partnership Program, CONN. GEN. STAT. §
8-336f (1999).
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stick: The Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure.72 This stick
obligates a town, when sued by a developer whose proposal to
build affordable housing units has been rejected, to bear the
burden of proving that there is no need for more affordable
housing in the town. Municipalities often benefit from an
evidentiary presumption that legislative decisions by a unit of
government are properly made.73 Due to this presumption, the
challenger of a municipal decision bears the burden of proving
that the decision was illegal or unconstitutional.74 The procedure
outlined in section 8-30g effectively nullifies that presumption.75
Therefore, under the particular circumstances of a section 8-30g
appeal, the municipality bears the risk of non-persuasion.
Under the Act, the reversal of the presumption of regularity
only occurs if the proposal before the local land use commission
includes at least twenty-five percent of the units with deed or
lease covenants ensuring that those units will be sold or rented
at affordable housing prices for at least thirty years.76 The
burden-shifting provision does not apply to a municipality if at
least ten percent of its dwelling units are either publicly assisted
units77 or are subject to deed or the lease restrictions ensuring
that the selling or leasing prices are affordable, as defined in the
state. The Connecticut Department of Economic and
Community Development publishes a list of the exempt towns
each year, based on information supplied by the towns. Thirty-
two towns have at least ten percent of their housing stock in the
affordable category on the State's most recent exemption list.78
72 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999).
73 See, e.g., Murach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of New London, 491 A.2d
1058, 1066 (Conn. 1985) (discussing zoning commission); see also Brecciaroli v.
Commission of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 945, 948 (Conn. 1975) (suggesting
findings of municipality are paramount).
74 See Murach, 491 A.2d at 1066; Brecciaroli, 362 A.2d at 952.
75 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §8-30g(c) (1999) ("[The burden shall be on the
commission.").
76 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(a) (1999); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-39a
(1999) (defining "affordable housing").
77 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(f) (1999); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-
30g(a)(3) (1999) (defining "assisted housing").
78 Memo "To All Interested Parties" from Patricia Downs, Executive Director,
Program Planning and Evaluation, Connecticut Department of Economic
Development, Feb. 10, 1999. Interestingly, Downs' Memo "To All Interested Parties"
five years ago, in 1994, stated that only twenty six towns were exempt.
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The ten percent figure was not a statement about the ideal
number or fair share of affordable housing units that a town
should have. Rather, it was an attempt to protect towns that
already had a significant number of affordable housing units
from the expense of defending a rejection of an affordable
housing proposal. It was recognized that the definition of
affordable housing was too narrow.79 This resulted in fewer
affordable units credited to a town than were warranted. An
attempt was made to offset that by offering an exemption
percentage that was significantly lower than what would be
required of towns if Connecticut were to provide sufficient
affordable housing.
If the municipality is not exempt, its rejection of an
affordable housing proposal will be sustained if the town can
"prove, based upon the evidence in the record" four elements.80
First, the reasons for the local commission's decision must be
supported by "sufficient" evidence in the record.81 Second, the
rejection of the application must be "necessary to protect
substantial public interests in health, safety, or other matters
which the commission may legally consider." 2 Third, those
interests must "clearly outweigh the need for affordable
housing."8 3 Fourth, those public interests cannot be protected by
reasonable changes to the affordable housing development.84
The Commission considered, of course, the existing models
for encouraging the development of affordable housing already
79 See Peter G. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure
Law in Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1268-70 (1997) (discussing criticism that
the Act... does not truly measure the amount of affordable housing in their town
because it precludes consideration of affordable housing that is neither publicly
assisted nor covenant restricted). The Housing Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon
Commission concluded that the cost of counting all the actually affordable housing
in a town each year would be enormous and not worth the precision such a survey
would yield. A survey would have to be made annually, perhaps bi-annually,
because an affordable housing unit this year, unless restricted by covenants or by
the terms of public support, may well go up in price because of a tighter housing
market, and would no longer be affordable.
80 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c) (1999).
81 Id. § 8-30g(c)(1)(A).
82 Id. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B).
83 Id. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C).
8 Id. § 8-30g(c)(1)(D).
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adopted by New Jersey and Massachusetts. 5 It seemed that the
effectiveness of New Jersey's Mount Laurel86 approach depended
upon a judiciary that was active enough to compensate for the
lack of initiative on the part of the other two branches of the
state government. In addition, Mount Laurel was decided in
1975,87 which is important because that was an era of greater
judicial activism on social issues than appeared to be the case in
1989, when Connecticut's Blue Ribbon Commission first
convened. The success of Mount Laurel also depended on finding
a plaintiff, and would have resulted in a delay of several years
before the Act would have an impact while awaiting a decision in
the all but certain appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
Massachusetts' Anti-Snob Zoning Law88 established a state
agency charged with hearing developers' appeals of town
rejections of affordable housing proposals.89 This administrative
appeal was inserted between the town's decision and a judicial
appeal of that decision.90 The Blue Ribbon Commission felt that
any effort to reduce a town's ability to keep out affordable
housing was going to be difficult for the legislature to pass. The
problem would be exacerbated by giving the Governor the
opportunity to appoint the members of an agency who would
have the power to override a town's zoning decision. The
symbolism of a state take-over of local government was
obvious. 91 Despite a constitutional provision guaranteeing home
rule to municipalities,92 Connecticut is politically, but not legally,
a strong home rule state.93 Just ask any town official or town
resident!94
85 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1996 & Supp. 1998); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-321 (West 1986).
8B See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
87 See id.
88 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
89 See id. § 22.
90 See id.
91 The comments of John Papandrea, Commissioner of the Department of
Housing and Co-Chair of the Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on Housing, at
the hearings of the Planning and Development Committee on the Affordable
Housing Appeals proposal, Minutes of the Planning and Development Committee,
Feb. 23, 2989, at 230 discuss this point.
92 See CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1.
93 See Hollister, The Myth and Reality of Home Rule Powers in Connecticut, 59
CONN. B.J. 389 (1985) (arguing that Home Rule in Connecticut is a myth, and that
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The Commission, therefore, chose to leave affordable
housing appeals to the courts to decide, believing that this was
the most neutral available venue. The Commission provided
them with the four criteria described above in subsection (c) of
the statute to guide them.95 It was not the intent to require that
every affordable housing proposal had to be approved by a town,
as there obviously can be some very good reasons for rejecting
particular proposals in particular locations. The Commission
sought criteria to balance a town's legitimate denial of affordable
housing proposals against a recognition that some rejections
could be pretextually couched in broad health, safety and welfare
language rather than expressing the real but less acceptable
reasons such as economic, racial, or ethnic discrimination.
Ultimately, the Commission provided that only "substantial"
considerations of "health and safety" would be sufficient to
justify rejection of an affordable housing proposal. It
deliberately omitted "welfare," from the traditional health,
safety, and welfare litany, as it had often been the basis for
upholding almost any municipal decision.
The Commission expected that the courts and the legislative
debates over the adoption of the Act would provide specific
content to the word "substantial," which has since been done.
For instance, the legislature's debates cited as examples of
substantial interests the protection of wetlands, a provision of an
adequate water supply, and waste disposal facilities. 96 Court
at best it extends only to matters of local concern as to which the state has not
acted); see also CONNECTICUT ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, HOME RULE IN CONNECTICUT: ITS HISTORY, STATUS AND
RECOIMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1987).
94 See Hollister, supra note 93 (providing legal background of the Home Rule
doctrine in Connecticut). Senator Lovegrove, in debates on the Act, remarked that
requiring the municipality to prove that its rejection of an affordable housing
application was justified under the Act (rather than continuing the old practice of
making the applicant bear the burden of proving that the municipality's decision
was improper) "turn[s] its back on a long belief in home rule in Connecticut." 32
Sen. Proc. Pt. 30, 1989 Sess., June 5, 1989, at 4054-55.
95 See supra Part II.B.
9 See Remarks of Rep. Cibes, at 32 H.R. Proc. Pt. 30, 1989 session, May 30,
1989, pp.10641-45 (affirming that a substantial health interest of a town would be a
concern that a proposed development had an adequate water supply, as well as the
capability of disposing of its waste); see also Greene v. Ridgefield Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 90-0442131S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 108, at *27-28
(Jan. 6, 1993) (upholding a town's rejection because the applicant had not complied
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decisions have upheld town denials of affordable housing
proposals because the dwellings were located in a flood plain,
and the developers had failed to provide sufficient protection for
the residents, or because statutorily required sedimentation and
erosion controls had not been satisfied.97 On the other hand,
courts have failed to uphold local decisions which had been based
on (1) inconsistency of the proposal with the town's existing
zoning regulations or with specially adopted affordable housing
regulations (the purpose of the Act was to substitute its
guidelines for those of local zoning regulations);98 (2) the
substantial distance from community facilities; 99 and (3) the
proposal's violation of a municipal cap on affordable housing
units or on multi-family housing in the community.100
Planners were among the Appeals Act's most outspoken
critics. The most common objection voiced by planners was that
the Act turned zoning over to developers. The town planner of
Trumbull lamented somewhat melodramatically that planners
have no choice but to accept affordable housing projects; "[w]e've
lost all control over zoning."1 1 One planner asserted that the
with wetlands standards); Frumento v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of N.
Branford, No. CV 94-0532862-S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1927, at *29-32 (July 30,
1996) (reversing a town's rejection which had denied applicant the right to use a
septic system instead of municipal sewers). Frumento indeed involved a public
health issue, but the town had only prohibited affordable housing applications from
using the septic system alternative.
97 See, e.g, United Progress, Inc. v. Borough of Stonington Planning and Zoning
Conm'n, No. CV 92-0513392S, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 575, at *65 (Mar. 4, 1994)
(upholding a denial of a developer's affordable housing proposal).
98 See Town Close Assocs. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of New Canaan, 679
A.2d 378 (Conn. App. 1996).
99 Greene v. Ridgefield, No. CV 90-04421315, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 108
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1993) (noting that the Town of Ridgefield lacked adequate
affordable housing, the court sustained the Board's denial of a permit to rezone and
build multi-family "affordable" dwellings). Id. at *29.
100 National Associated Properties v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of N.
Branford, 658 A.2d 114 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Shapiro Farm L.P. v. Planning and
Zoning Comm'n of N. Branford, No. CV 92-0517281S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2807 (Oct. 15, 1993).
101 Vodola, supra note 5, at 1265 (quoting Joan Gruce, Planning & Zoning
Administrator, Town of Trumbull). This characterization ignores the fact that even
as late as a year after her statement, towns had prevailed in fifty percent of the
appeals of their rejections. See id. at 1238 n.12. By 1997, developers had won sixty
percent of the cases. Id. at 1238 n.13.
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law elevated affordable housing over proper-land use planning.10 2
Another opined that the Act "says if you want to call it affordable
housing, you can get away with anything you can."10 3 Danbury
lost its appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court because the
Court held the city did not prove that its stated reasons for
rejection were genuine. In fact, the city's engineer provided the
evidence that the city's reasons were pretextual.10 4 The city
planner's response was that the people who wrote the Appeals
Act "don't understand zoning."10 5
Connecticut is the ninth most racially segregated state in
the United States.1°6 It is also the most economically segregated
state in the United States.10 7 Connecticut's residents have the
highest per capita income in the United States, but three of its
cities are among the twenty-one poorest cities in the country. 08
A sharp chasm between Connecticut's rich and its poor, between
its racial groups, and between its central cities and their
surrounding towns is a fact that should concern those officials
charged with responsibility for planning proper land uses in
Connecticut. 10 9  One effect of this racial and economic
102 See Vodola, supra note 5, at 1265 (citing a telephone interview with Robert
Nerney, Town Planner, Town of Southington).
103 Vodola, supra note 5, at 1264 (quoting William Kweder, Planning
Consultant, Town of Suffield) (internal quotations omitted).
104 See Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n of Danbury, 653 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1995).
105 Peter J. Vodola, Post-Litigation Results of Affordable Housing Land Use
Appeals: A Survey of Statistics & Opinions Concerning Decisions Based on the Act,
1990-1994 19 (Jan. 7, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (quoting
Telephone Interview with Dennis Elpern, City of Danbury Planning Director (Dec.
22, 1994)). This student project was the original basis for Vodola's later published
essay in the Connecticut Law Review, see supra note 5.
106 See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 114 (1995) (discussing these
statistics in the context of Connecticut's housing patterns and affordable housing).
107 See id. (blaming, among other things, the domination of central cities by
rental properties as the reason it is ranked first in economic segregation); see, e.g.,
Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (Conn. 1996) (discussing the effects of racial
segregation on school children).
1w5 See Jefferson B. Davis, Towns Will Rise Together, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan.
1, 1995, at El, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library. Stating economic
segregation as one of the largest problems facing Connecticut and discussing David
Rusk's "Cities Without Suburbs," which lists Hartford as the tenth poorest,
Bridgeport as the fourth from last, and New Haven as the twenty-first).
1o See American Institute of Certified Planners, CODE OF ETHICS &
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § A.5 ("The Planner's Responsibility to the Public") (1981)
[hereinafter CODE]. "A planner must strive to expand choice and opportunity for all
persons, recognizing a special responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged
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segregation, because poor people reside in the cities and new
entry level jobs are being created in the suburbs, will be a
continuing cycle of economic disparity. The town planners,
however, said the housing patterns fostered by the traditional
zoning system were preferable to the patterns sought to be
achieved by this legislation. The statute was aimed at
eliminating the barriers to economic and racial integration, both
at home and at work, and at equalizing educational opportunity.
The Act sought to foster the recognition that housing,
education, transportation, and jobs-important issues for people
of all incomes-were a common concern for all those persons
living in a particular metropolitan area. The Connecticut
Supreme Court, in the first two affordable housing cases it
decided, did not address the issue of the legislature's intent with
respect to the local versus regional scope of the Affordable
Housing Act. 10 In the first of these cases, the court reasoned
that if substantially less than ten percent of the housing stock of
the town of West Hartford was affordable then the question as to
whether regional or land affordable housing need was an
element the town was required to consider, was not relevant to
the outcome of the case."' The court recognized in the West
groups and persons, and must urge the alteration of policies, institutions and
decisions which oppose such needs." Id. Ethical problems arise whenever there are
multiple obligations prescribing different courses of conduct. In the affordable
housing context, municipal planners face a conflict between their duty to their
superiors, see id. at § B, and their obligation to further the development of the
profession, see id. at § C. The proper conduct is never clear, but it seems the quoted
section A.5 at the least requires that planners' statements about the Affordable
Housing Appeal Act to reflect an awareness that the Act furthers the goal
underlying section A.5-that housing for poor people is a professional priority. The
statements by planners quoted in Vodola's article, supra note 5, some of which are
repeated here, do not even suggest that planners should plan for the poor as well
as for the better off (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http:www.planning.org/abtaicp/conduct.
html>. See generally Elizabeth Howe, ACTING ON ETHICS IN CITY PLANNING (1994)
(quoting CODE, supra, at 212-14).
Generalizations are never entirely accurate and, of course, not all planners in
Connecticut were as vehemently opposed to the Act as those quoted. See Vodola,
supra note 5, at 1264-66 (quoting planners in Berlin, South Windsor, and
Farmington-to name only a few-who agreed with the purposes of the statute, and
offered constructive comments).
o10 See Christian Activities Council v. Town Council of Glastonbury, 735 A.2d
231 (Conn. 1999); West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council of W.
Hartford, 636 A.2d 1342 (Conn. 1994).
M See West Hartford Interfaith, 636 A.2d at 1349 (reviewing legislative history
to ascertain purpose). In 1993, 4.7% of West Hartford's housing stock was
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Hartford case that both the chair of the Judiciary Committee
and the primary sponsor of the bill in the State Senate stated in
the legislative debates that the bill being voted on reflected an
abandonment of the Blue Ribbon Commission bill's regional
focus.112 The court also observed, however, that if each town had
to consider its own need for affordable housing, wealthy towns
would never have any need, which therefore would render the
purpose of the Act unattainable.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently dealt perhaps
a mortal blow to the Affordable Housing Appeals Act's effort to
employ a means for spreading affordable housing throughout a
region. In Christian Activities Council v. Town Council of
Glastonbury, the court watered-down a town's obligation to
support affordable housing to the level it existed prior to the
adoption of the Act, ten years ago.113 The court determined that
a town did not have any responsibility for providing affordable
housing for those residing beyond the town's borders. As the
court observed, the legislative history supports the court's
localist interpretation114 In its two earlier decisions, however,
brought on appeals under the Act in West Hartford and
Danbury," 5 the court had not decided whether the need for
affordable housing was to be determined within the town's
boundaries on a regional or on a statewide basis. The court
declined to decide the local-regional scope of need in Kaufman v.
Zoning Comm'n of Danbury, because the city's reasons for
rejecting the affordable housing application were inadequate
under the law. Consequently, there was no reason to balance
them against the need for affordable housing on whatever
geographical unit that need might be measured.116 The court
declined to decide the issue in the West Hartford case because
the town did not have enough affordable housing even within its
considered affordable under the Act. See Letter from Sandy Bergin, Supervisor
Research Unit, Department of Housing, to All Interested Parties (Mar. 13, 1993) (on
file with the author).
112 See id. at 1348.
113 Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 241.
114 See id. at 250 ("Th[e] legislative history compels the conclusion that the
legislature intended the need for affordable housing to be determined on the basis of
the need for such housing in the local community, as opposed to a regional or
statewide basis.") (footnote omitted).
115 See id. at 249.
116 See Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n of Danbury, 653 A.2d at 821 n.25.
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own borders. Hence, the need for affordable housing existed
both in the region and in the town. 117 The same is true of
Glastonbury, only more so. In 1999, it had less affordable
housing than did West Hartford.
By adopting a local frame of reference for measuring the
need for affordable housing, the court undermined one of the
Act's primary mechanisms for achieving its purpose of having
more affordable housing constructed. The court required towns
to specify the interests that they believed were more important
than affordable housing. Glastonbury had defended its rejection
of the affordable housing application by asserting that its
members knew of other sites for affordable housing available in
the town, although the town offered no proof for that
assertion.118 The majority of the court correctly held-pursuant
to traditional zoning rules in Connecticut-that zoning
commission members are entitled to take into account their
personal knowledge of the town.119 But the effect of allowing
commission members to rely on unsupported beliefs when
rejecting an application is equivalent to requiring the applicant
to prove that there are no other sites in town.120 By requiring
the municipality to prove its lack of need for additional
affordable housing, the Act sought to eliminate pretextual
reasons for denying an application.121 If there is not enough
117 See id. at 821 & n.25; see also West Hartford Interfaith, 636 A.2d at 1354
n.23.
118 See Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 254.
119 See id. at 254 (citing Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n of
Killingly, 538 A.2d 1039 (Conn. 1988), in support of the traditional view a zoning
appeal which did not involve affordable housing). Interestingly, the Court also cited
West Hartford Interfaith, 636 A.2d at 1352. See id.
120 As the dissent pointed out, requiring the applicant to prove that a given
parcel of land is the only location in town where affordable housing could be built "is
exceedingly unlikely.... Under the majority's view, therefore, the zoning authority
could always reject an affordable housing proposal by pointing to an available piece
of property someplace else." Christian Activities Council, 725 A.2d at 267 n.22
(Berdon, J., dissenting).
121 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town
of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 941, (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988),
considered a similar defense. The town asserted that there were many other sites in
town where the plaintiff could have located its affordable housing project, and which
would not have conflicted with a town policy on land use. The Court replied that
although an applicant is not entitled to compel approval of the site of its choice, the
town could not require the applicant to use the site that is the town's choice if the
use of that site would impose "undue hardships" on the applicant, whether or not
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affordable housing in either the region or the town, the question
of a regional or local focus is just as irrelevant in Christian
Activities Council as it was in West Hartford Interfaith.
In addition, the court's newly localist interpretation ignored
an existing statutory requirement that municipalities' zoning
regulations "shall also encourage the development of housing
opportunities, including opportunities... for all residents of the
municipality and the planning region in which the municipality
is located .... Such regulations shall also promote housing
choice and economic diversity in housing, including housing for
both low and moderate income households .... ".122
It appears, therefore, that an effective means of broadening
Connecticut's municipalities' local perspective on the problem of
the availability of affordable housing has been aborted.'2 For a
time, the Connecticut courts encouraged a wider perspective
when analyzing the critical problem of housing availability.124
Initially, the Supreme Court had emphasized that the legislature
recognized the purpose of the Act was to change traditional
zoning so that more affordable housing would be approved. 125
the town's motives were suspect. Huntington was relied on by the Blue Ribbon
Commission and cited by Christian Activities Council. See Christian Activities
Council, 735 A.2d at 262 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
'2 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2 (1999) (emphasis added).
' See "To All Interested Parties," supra note 78 (noting the increase in the
number of towns credited with having more than ten percent of their housing stock
affordable, an increase of twenty-three percent in five years during a period when
housing costs have been rising).
2 See also Vodola, supra note 5, at 1289 n.271 (citing a 1995 letter from
Patricia Downs, Director of Policy and Planning for the Connecticut Department of
Housing stating that 114 municipalities have less than five percent affordable
housing, 29 have between five percent and ten percent; and 26 have above ten
percent.
m See West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council of W. Hartford, 636
A.2d 1342, 1349 (Conn. 1994) ("Our review of the statute's legislative history reveals
that the key purpose of § 8-30g is to encourage and facilitate the much needed
development of affordable housing throughout the state."); Kaufman v. Zoning
Comm'n of Danbury, 653 A.2d 798, 809 (Conn. 1995) (noting that the legislation was
remedial and that it was against the statute's policy to increase the cost of
affordable housing). The dissent in Christian Activities Council quotes the
legislative debates over the proposed bill to show that the opponents considered the
proposal as the end of traditional zoning and that the bill's proponents agreed with
that assessment. Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 257-58 (Berdon, J.,
dissenting). The dissenter had concurred with the majority in the earlier two
Affordable Housing Appeals Act cases.
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But the legislature had sent mixed signals about its intent,126
and in the most recent case, Christian Activities Council, a
majority of the Court chose to ignore that legislative purpose and
instead emphasized statements by the Act's sponsors that a
regional approach was not envisaged. This holding ensures the
continuation of the slow pace of affordable housing development
in the state.127 A legislature unable to clearly articulate the
premises for a regional consideration of housing needs, a
supreme court newly charmed by the complaisance of "steady
habits,"12 and a planning profession which has allowed its public
posture on affordable housing to be established by planners who
enthusiastically assert that zoning is really local law-this is a
powerful coalition of interests working against regionally based
solutions to current social problems.
C. Sheffv. O'Neill
The court in Sheff v. O'Neill,129 offered a more promising
step toward an increased regional consciousness. 130 Arguments
have been completed in this latest effort to equalize funding
among Connecticut's public school districts. Twenty five years
ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Horton v. Meskil1131
ordered the state to provide more equalized funding for school
children, regardless of the ad valorem wealth of the town in
which the district was located.13 2 Nonetheless, Connecticut's
public schools and cities have become more economically (and
126 See Christian Activities Council, 735 A.2d at 238 n.11 ("Our search of the
legislative history has not disclosed any evidence of legislative intent....").
2 See id. at 238 (noting the basis of its decision as the "text and the purpose of
the statute" as found in previous cases).
128 Id. at 243 n.20 (stating the blue ribbon commission rejected the
Massachusetts plan as something "too strong and too much of a departure" for
Connecticut, which often refers to itself as the land of "steady habits").
m 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
130 See id. at 1289.
131 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
132 See id. at 374-75; see also Roseann G. Padula, Comment, The Plight of
Connecticut's Brightest Students: Broadley v. Meriden Board of Education, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1319, 1319-20 (1997) (stating that Horton resulted in "reformation of the
state system of school financing"). But see Rachel F. Moran, Milo's Miracle, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1079, 1095 (1997) (quoting Wesley W. Horton, the father of the
plaintiff in Horton, who said that there are still many "financial inequities" in 1992).
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racially) segregated. 13 In the early nineties, the plaintiffs in
Sheff brought an action claiming that the de facto racial
segregation in Hartford's public schools prevented them from
providing equal education for all of Connecticut's children, as
required by the state constitution. 34
School district boundaries are a major issue in Sheff.13 5
Since Connecticut's cities and towns are now rigidly
segregated, 13 6 municipalities' schools can only be integrated by
moving school district boundaries, thereby incorporating sections
of the adjoining white suburbs to create multi-town school
districts. Since 1910, Connecticut's public school district
boundaries have been required by statute to follow municipal
boundaries. 137 The only exceptions are the various regional
school districts formed by two or three neighboring
municipalities. These rare regional structures are almost
entirely in outlying rural areas of Connecticut. 138 But in general,
the effect of the race-neutral statute, under current settlement
patterns, ensures that public schools can never become
integrated. This fact violates the state constitution.139
A majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's holding in Sheff that the state's school districting
1=s Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104
HARv. L. REv. 1072, 1085 (1991) (arguing that the courts should take action to
ensure remedies for inequalities the legislature has failed to correct). See also infra
note 138 and accompanying text.
14 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271; CONN. CONST. of 1965, art. VIII, § 1 (duty to
provide a public education); id. at art. I, §§ 1, 20 (guaranteeing equal rights and
protection and prohibiting segregation).
'm See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1274 ("[The trial court] found that school district lines
would have to be redrawn in order to remedy effectively the severe racial, ethnic
and socioeconomic isolation that exists in the Hartford public school system.").
m See id. at 1272-73 (noting the stipulation of the parties to the fact that while
ninety-two percent of the students in Hartford's public schools were minorities, only
seven of the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns had more than a ten percent
minority enrollment in their public schools).
'37 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-240 (1999).
138 See Mfichael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The
Remedies Problem Posed by Sheffv. O'Neill-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1115, 1163 n.174 (1997) (noting that the legislature increased the number of
regions in CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 10-264a(2), 10-264k to increase public participation,
especially in rural areas).
19 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273, 1289 (recognizing the finding of the trial court-
whose decision it reversed-that racial isolation in the Hartford public schools is
likely to worsen); see also CONN. CONST. of 1965, art. 1, § 20 (providing for equal
protection and thereby prohibiting segregation).
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statute was the "single most important factor"14° contributing to
the current de facto school segregation,141 and that the
districting scheme violated the state constitution.142 The state,
therefore, had a constitutional duty to correct the inequality of
educational opportunity. The court issued a declaratory
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs yet "stay[ed its] hand"'4 to
provide the General Assembly and the executive branch with an
opportunity to take the necessary steps to correct the
constitutionally impermissible isolation of minorities.'4 The
superior court was directed to retain jurisdiction in order to
supervise the carrying out of an appropriate remedy.14 A
vigorous'4 dissent argued that the constitutionally deficient
education the plaintiffs were receiving in Hartford's public
schools was not due to racial or ethnic isolation, but instead was
the product of poverty "and all of the social pathologies that are
closely associated with poverty and its concentration." 147
Necessarily, any remedial steps will have to break down the
impermeability of inter-town political boundaries as applied to
school districts, given the stark racial identification of those
boundaries. The State did respond to the Connecticut Supreme
Court decision in Sheff by increasing the funding for magnet
schools, charter schools, lighthouse schools, and several other
interdistrict cooperative programs'4 which draw children from a
district whose boundaries are not within the political jurisdiction
in which the school is located. But in March 1998, nearly two
years after the decision in Sheff, the same plaintiffs asked the
140 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 1290.
144 See id. at 1290-91 (adapting the Horton I method of granting declaratory
relief while maintaining jurisdiction).
145 See id. at 1291.
14 See id. at 1298 (Borden, J., dissenting). The ninety-one page dissent at one
point characterized the majority opinion as "long on rhetoric and short on
reasoning." Id.
147 Id. at 1334. The dissent would have held that the overwhelming weight of
the evidence before the trial court supported its conclusion that poverty, not racial
and ethnic isolation, was the cause for the sub par achievements of Hartford public
school children. See id. at 1313.
148 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925, 928-34 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)




superior court to declare that the state was not proceeding fast
enough or effectively enough to provide the proper relief.149 The
superior court has recently rebuffed their arguments, holding
that the state should be given more time to implement the
remedies called for in a report commissioned by the
legislature.150
The superior court's description of the programs that have
been undertaken since the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision
in Sheff holds some promise that the legislature is recognizing a
need to deal with district boundary lines. The superior court
described the Choice program as an interdistrict program that
more than quadrupled the participation level of its predecessor
program.151 The Choice program requires the receiving district
to keep the student in its system at least until the student has
graduated from the particular school building to which he or she
had been assigned.15 2 Suburban school districts committed 1400
openings statewide for the 1998-99 school year.153 "Lighthouse
Schools" is a new program funding improvements in urban
schools so that they can attract students from outside their
districts and, at some point, become "magnet schools." 154 The
original Lighthouse School in New Haven attracted
"approximately 500 children from outside New Haven"155 for the
1998-99 school year.156 State funding for 1900 students to enroll
outside their districts in these two programs represents a mere
token of the need for breaking down municipally based school
districts. It should be noted, however, that Choice pays for
urban children to attend suburban schools, and Lighthouse
Schools pay to bring suburban children to urban schools. Both
programs recognize that a long term commitment to regional
interaction is necessary to break down the invisible, yet
149 See id. at 938.
160 See id. (noting that "the plaintiffs failed to wait a reasonable time and that
their return to court was premature").
11 See id. at 932-33 (discussing the benefits that have thus far resulted from
the implementation of the project).
152 See id. at 933 ("The student is also the responsibility of the receiving district
for all disciplinary purposes.").
13 See id. (discussing the "Lighthouse Schools" program).
154 See id. at 933-34.
'5 See id. at 933
156 See id. at 932-33 (reviewing the text of PA. 97-290 § 3, which had a
provision for lighthouse schools).
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substantial, barriers that continue to exist between racial,
ethnic, and economic groups in Connecticut.157 The true test is
whether the effort will continue, or fade out as Sheff falls into
the background of political consciousness. One hopeful sign is
the creation of Regional Education Service Centers. Each school
district in the state is required to report to its Center evidence of
the district's progress in reducing racial, ethnic, and economic
isolation.158 The superior court viewed this requirement as one
of the reasons for the "increased interest in interdistrict
programs."159
Conversely, one cannot be too optimistic about seeing the
way to separating school boundaries from political boundaries.
It is this failure to separate these boundaries that is the
fundamental cause of the isolation of racial, ethnic, and economic
minorities. 160 The lack of openness to changed conditions, the
basis for Connecticut's motto, "The Land of Steady Habits," is
dramatically illustrated by the fact that while Connecticut still
has a law requiring school district boundaries to track municipal
boundaries, "[miore than seventy-five percent of school districts
in the United States are not contiguous with any other local
boundary; only about one in ten tracks city boundaries."161
D. Regional Asset Districts
Regional Asset Districts are the latest regional cooperation
idea to attract significant attention among regionalists in
Connecticut. 162 The idea is to have elected officials in each region
of the state come to a consensus identifying their Regional
Assets-including cultural facilities (like the Wadsworth
157 See id. at 932-34 (discussing both the "Choice Program" and the
"Lighthouse Program").
158 See id. at 934-35 (discussing the functions of the regional centers).
159 Id. at 935; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-4b (1999) (concerning filing of
complaints against the State Board of Education).
160 See Sheff II, 733 A.2d at 935 (noting evidence that the changes were not
begun until an "ineffectual board of education" had been dissolved).
161 Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 53 (1998) (emphasis
added).
162 See Editorial, Don't Give Up On Asset Districts, HARTFORD COURANT, June
8, 1998, at A8 (listing among the Regional Assets Districts supporters-mayors, the
Connecticut Conference of Municipalities, the Metro Hartford Millennium Project,
several regional chambers of commerce, and a large number of state business
leaders), available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
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Atheneum), athletic fields, and transportation facilities (such as
walking trails).1 3 The designated Assets would be eligible for
public funding to help sustain them, although the level of
funding in any of the proposal's three legislative manifestations
would be insufficient to pay any one Asset's costs of operation.
The rationale is that Regional Assets are used by people
throughout the region, regardless of an Asset's location and the
user's home town, yet any public support the Assets presently
enjoy comes almost entirely from the town in which the Asset is
located. Most of the Regional Assets used to exemplify the
activities that would be supported are either in the central cities
or in the outer suburbs and rural areas where the property tax
base available to support public activities is lower than the
state's average. 164 The proposed legislation would reduce some of
the inequality between the location of Regional Assets and the
location of public support for them.165
A bill to create Regional Assets Districts was first
introduced in the legislature in 1997.166 It would have
authorized Regional Councils of Governments (COGs) and
Regional Councils of Elected Officials (CEOs) to issue bonds and
levy taxes to provide the funding for the Regional Assets, but it
failed to pass.16 7 This was because legislators were concerned
that towns would lose control over the use of those Assets in
their town.1r- A substantially modified version was reintroduced
163 See Regional Asset Districts; Let's Borrow a Good Idea, HARTFORD COURANT,
Mar. 22, 1998, at C2 (listing examples of possible amenities such as theatres,
stadiums, natural history museums, and zoos), available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library.
16 See Mike Swifi, Proposals Offer Aid to Ailing Cities, HARTFORD COURANT,
Mar. 3, 1996, at Al (noting that the Regional Asset Districts could solve the tax and
revenue problems because the program would make it possible to connect the people
who use the properties to the financing of the properties), available in LEXIS, News
& Information Library.
165 See Mike Swift, Regionalism Runs into Opposition, HARTFORD COURANT,
Nov. 30, 1997, at D1 (Senator Jefferson Davis, co-chair of the legislature's Planning
and Development Committee, supporting the measure: "remember the far more
important issue.., you need to have a vibrant central city in order to have a
vibrant regional economy."), available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
16 See id.
167 See id.
16s See S. Proc. Apr. 7, 1999, pp. 00907-09. Senator Herlihy, an opponent of the
Bill, discussed its history, concluding it was just one more example of the "big
government philosophy" which would lead to more taxes eventually. Id.; see also
Mike Swift, The New Wave of Regional Cooperation; Local Leaders Shifting Focus,
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in 1998,169 but it again failed to pass despite significant
additional legislative and business support.170 This second
version called for an allocation of state sales tax revenues to
provide the funds for the support of the regionally designated
Assets. Its supporters also emphasized, to no avail, that no new
taxes were being authorized, and that the COGs and CEOs were
not afforded any new taxing or bonding powers. 171 "We in
Connecticut do not need [nior want regional government."172 A
third effort was made in the spring of 1999, and it did not
provide for any funding at all. 173 The COGS and CEOs would, as
in previous versions, have designated the Regional Assets, but
they were not required to participate in the program. Any
financial support would have been voluntary. Yet for a third
time the bill died, despite the lack of any required public
financial support. Although it passed in the Senate, it never
came to the floor for a vote in the General Assembly.174
III. WHY REGIONALISM, ANYWAY?
As the discussions above illustrate, Connecticut does not
qualify as a state that is leading the way toward regionally
oriented thinking or acting. The Affordable Housing Appeals
Procedure, our most developed effort to openly confront
municipal self-orientation, has not been wildly successful in
either the number of affordable housing units developed under
its aegis, or in breaking down the ideology of "my town first, last,
and always."175 The fact that the procedure is far from
HARTFORD COURANT, May 25, 1997, at Al (statement of Senator Martin Looney
stating that the measure failed because of legislators' fear of losing local control),
available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
169 See Mike Swift, Regional Asset Idea Builds Momentum, HARTFORD
COURANT, Feb. 3, 1998, at A3, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
170 See Editorial, Don't Give up on Asset Districts, HARTFORD COURANT, June 8,
1998, at A8, available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
171 See supra notes 163, 170.
172 Flyer distributed by supporters of the proposed legislation in 1998, "What
You Should Know About The Regional Assets Bill (H.B. 5683)" (n.d.).
173 See ACT OF APR. 1, 1999, OH. 107, 1999 CONN. LAWS 1076 (authorizing
regional assets investments).
174 See Christopher Keating et al., Lawmakers Toss Adriaen's Landing a
Lifeline, HARTFORD COURANT, June 10, 1999, at Al (noting that the General
Assembly failed to consider the Regional Asset Districts after the Senate had
approved the measure), available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
176 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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developing greater cooperation among metropolitan area towns
is best illustrated by the fact that its most vocal and vehement
opponents are the municipal planners themselves. With
planners like that, one is tempted to say, who needs planners?
The one bright spot for regional thinking in Connecticut is
Sheff v. O'Neill, which successfully raised the question of
whether inter-town boundaries should be as sacrosanct as our
political rhetoric would have them be.'76 The implication of the
success of Sheff, thus far, is that regional land use planning is
not succeeding in breaking down the rigid physical and mental
boundary lines between our towns. In fact, it is localized land
use planning in the form of zoning regulations that have been
largely responsible for creating and maintaining the racially and
economically segregated housing patterns in Connecticut. These
housing patterns are at the heart of the racial, ethnic, and
economic isolation of the children who were the plaintiffs in
Sheff.
On the other hand, despite the fact that a proposal to create
Regional Assets Districts would simply empower towns to create
completely voluntary inter-town districts that could support
amenities to benefit the participating towns, such a proposal
could not pass the state legislature.177 The money to provide the
benefits would not require any new taxes at any level, because it
would come from existing town resources-voluntarily, so that
the towns could determine what they would get for their
contributions. Even this relatively toothless tiger is threatening,
and one really must have faith in the legislative strategy of
incrementalism to see anything promising from Regional Assets
Districts.
176 See Warren Woodberry, Jr., Sheff vs. O'Neill Topic of NAACP Conference
Talks, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 31, 1998, at B3, available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library. The NAACP Conference's subject was the current state of
desegregation in Hartford, looking at the efforts taken since Sheff. "Since the Sheff
ruling, desegregation efforts have included millions of dollars of state educational
aid, a host of school programs and greater minority staff recruitment efforts." Id.;
see also Rosalinda DeJesus, Plan Would Integrate Area School Districts, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 8, 1999, at Bl (describing one of over twelve forums held by the
Connecticut Center for School Change in order to hear a variety of opinions about
ways to desegregate Connecticut schools in light of the Sheff decision of 1996),
available in LEXIS, News & Information Library.
177 See supra notes 162-174 and accompanying text.
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What is one afraid of? No one "lives" in one town anymore,
in the sense that their home, their place of employment, the
stores where they shop, the places they get their cars and
appliances repaired, and the movie theatres they go to are all in
one town. In fact, most of us are concerned with what happens
in at least three towns and for most of us many more.178 An old
solution to the problem of living in this multi-town environment
was to consolidate the metropolitan area towns and to create a
regional mini-legislature. That "solution" was last tried, to my
knowledge, in the 1950s and 1960s, when Nashville was joined
to surrounding Davidson county, Indianapolis with its
surrounding towns, Metropolitan Toronto was created, and one
or two other mega-mergers were carried off.' 79 No one proposes
such solutions now, at least not with an expectation that they
will be adopted. 80 These days, metropolitan reformers turn out
to support (some quite strongly) the values of localism at the
same time as they condemn its short-sightedness.181 The current
prevailing idea is that one should find methods for "softening"
the boundaries between towns in areas where the externalities
between towns in close proximity to each other are particularly
pervasive, but without impairing local autonomy "too much."182
A few years ago, Connecticut was perhaps one of the leaders
in trying to find regionally oriented ways for confronting the
extremely difficult social problems of affordable housing and
effective public schools; Connecticut General Statute § 8-30g and
178 One of the streets in the author's neighborhood in Hartford is a through
street from West Hartford east into Hartford and is heavily used by traffic going
east in the morning, and west in the afternoon. For several years the street
deteriorated into a seamless pothole, while Hartford repaved the local streets that
crossed the through street. Since the through street was almost entirely used by
West Hartford residents, it was widely thought that Hartford officials did not feel
any need to use city resources to repair it.
179 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1996).
180 See id. at 1115, 1118-23, 1165-68 (1996); see also Jerry Frug, The
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1077-78 (1996).
181 See, e.g., supra note 179, at 1163-65.
182 See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard
Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1187-95 (1996) (proposing that residents of
metropolitan area should be allowed to vote in the elections held by any of the
municipalities within that metropolitan area).
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the supreme court's decision in Sheff were beacon lights.183 Our
leadership is no longer apparent, because the Affordable
Housing Appeals Act has been critically crippled, and the
remedies for the boundary problem described in Sheff put on
hold. Our capacity for confronting the difficult affordable
housing and effective public schools problems may be waning.
One alternative to thinking of these problems as city vs.
suburb, or urban vs. rural, may be to discard the political
boundary basis for thinking about these problems. For example,
the latest buzz word in planning and political circles is "sprawl,"
which no one seems to favor.184 But can any of us describe or
define the much disliked sprawl. Is it that living patterns are
spread out "too much?" Is it that development has leapfrogged
over undeveloped land, causing unnecessary spreading out? Or
is it the unending stretch of low-density or single-use
development that defines sprawl? Or is it the traffic congestion
that seems endemic to new developments (as well as old)? Or is
it the lack of a crowded center that makes a community sprawl?
Or is it the result of competition between towns for economic
development assets, broadly defined as a range of activities from
cultural attractions like a summer home for the Hartford
183 See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the state
legislature has an affirmative duty to remedy segregation in public schools); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999) (Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Act).
184 The author has heard a lawyer-academic active in historic preservation
defend sprawl and has read a paper by two economists who ardently support the
sprawl approach to land development. Not surprisingly, the preservationist is from
Arizona, and the two economists teach at the University of Southern California in
Los Angeles. Conversation with Grady Gammage, Jr., Adjunct Professor at the
Arizona State University Colleges of Architecture and of Law, Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 1998); see also Peter Gordon and Harry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a
Desirable Planning Goal?, 63 J. THE AM. PLANNING ASSOC. 95, 99 (1997) ("But that
suburbanization itself should be an object of attack is amazing, given the expressed
preferences of the majority of Americans for suburban lifestyles and the supposed
sanctity of consumer sovereignty."); Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and
Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 STAN. L. REV. & POLY REV. 11, 16 (1997) (defining
sprawl as "excessive land consumption and destruction of natural resources and
farmland [which] results in region-wide inefficiencies in public facilities and
infrastructure, and places unnecessary fiscal pressures on suburban governments.");
Tom Condon, Sprawling Our Way Into Oblivion, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 10,
1995, at B1 (criticizing sprawl in Connecticut and listing several harms resulting
from sprawl), available in LEIS, News & Information Library.
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Symphony, to more mundane job producing enterprises such as a
Staples warehouse? 85
These are the most common definitions of sprawl as used by
the major critics of the phenomenon who have written since the
publication of William H. Whyte's The Last Landscape in
1968.186 It seems that many people consider otherwise
acceptable physical development patterns to be sprawl because
of their unacceptable impacts in a given areas. 8 7 It is not a
particular development pattern itself that is labeled "sprawl,"
but rather the perception that a particular area is not so nice
anymore, that growth in a specific location regardless of its
shape has been bad. It is the over-crowdedness of the old town
center, or its loss of character that constitutes sprawl, not the
fact that open land is being subdivided.'88 Or it could be the
subdividing of an old farm that had captured the loyalty of area
residents with an outlet store that sold fresh milk, home made
ice cream, etc. This is perhaps why so many of the people
complaining about sprawl live in areas that are zoned for
mni~mum lot sizes of one acre or more, and are not sewered or do
not have a public water supply.189 For if sprawl referred
primarily to the spreading of widely scattered single family
homes over a broad landscape, some of the residents out there
would surely recognize that they are the "sprawlers." In the view
of Vermont's Governor Howard Dean, speaking at an
Environmental Protection Agency conference in Boston earlier
this year, "[SIprawl is more a problem of maintaining
communities than it is a problem of wanton development.
185 Testimony of Lisa Santacroce before the Planning and Development
Committee, Mar. 1, 1999, p. 000568.
186 See Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles-Style Sprawl Desirable?, 63 J. AM.
PLANNING ASSOC. 107-08 (1997); see generally WILLIAM H. WHYTE, THE LAST
LANDSCAPE (1968).
187 See Ewing, supra note 186, at 107-08.
188 See Daniella Altimari & Carolyn Moreau, EPA Steps in to Curb Development
Sprawl, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 3, 1999, at A6 (discussing the recent call for
federal action by the EPA and quoting a Hartford architect: "Ultimately you lose
your sense of neighborhood and community!"), available in LEXIS, News &
Information Library.
189 Cf ROBERT YARO ET AL., DEALING WITH CHANGE IN THE CONNECTICUT




Working with developers and our communities, we can maintain
our traditional villages and rural landscapes." 9 0
Governor Dean's message does not view sprawl as a strictly
traditional regional planning problem. His view is concerned
with focusing on the best locations for various land uses
depending on physical characteristics of the landscape and the
infrastructure available to serve it-transportation networks,
the location of the best land for farming, open space
preservation, the existence of sewers, etc. An alternative to
sprawl-control does not necessarily require town by town
adoption of a no-growth model of development. If sprawl refers
to the destruction of favorite places and familiar buildings, or at
least the important ones, or too many of them, the sprawl
problem is one of local planning where there should be a
recognition that local favorites are now, in our multi-town
society, regional favorites as well. Favorite sites may also
spread across several towns, of course, the most common being
natural formations such as the Housatonic River valley, the
mountain ranges listed in § 8-1aa of the Connecticut Statutes,' 9 '
or the Appalachian Trail. The preservation of these sites
requires cooperation among the municipalities sharing the
resource. At the same time, many of the examples used by the
proponents of Regional Assets Districts reflect the concern for
the familiar and the old favorites. This concern is only one more
example of the need to find a basis for intermunicipal
cooperation, be it institutional or simply resting on a new
perception of how increasingly interrelated everyone's life and
activities are. But these favorite and familiar places need to be
accessible to all; not simply in that they are open to the public,
but that all may become members of the public supporting
community. In this effort, one must depend on leaders to point
the way. The Connecticut Supreme Court has accepted some of
this responsibility (at least until its recent Christian Activities
Council decision on Glastonbury's affordable housing
application), and the legislature has also taken responsibility,
190 Fighting Sprawl: The Feds Step In, CONN. PRESERVATION NEWS, MarJApr.
1999, at 6.
191 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-1aa (1999) (authorizing town zoning commissions to
regulate buildings and structures within a statutorily defined ridgeline protective
area on forty-four listed mountains in Connecticut).
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albeit with more half-heartedness. One wishes that more of the
land use planning professionals in Connecticut would join them
so that the promise of regional land use planning can be fulfilled.
